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LIMITATIONS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPS
"TIDE TIME IS OUT OF JOINT"
avid gaver*
Toronto
TY-
The question whether a right is barred through effluxion oftime is one thatshould
be easily ascertained and understood. This is as truefor intellectual properly law
asfor any other area . The laws establishing copyrights, patents, designs, trade-
marks, plant breeders' rights and integrated circuit topography rights do not,
however, live up to this standard. Instead they create trapsfor both common and
civil lawyers. The author argues that thepresent confusion should be eliminated
by the passage of a single federal limitation statute applying to all intellectual
property and drawing from the principles found in the more recently reformed
provincial limitation laws.
La questionde savoir si un droitestprescritparle passage du temps en est une qui
devrait être facilement résolue et comprise . Ceci est vrai aussi bien pour la
propriété intellectuelle que pour tout autre secteur. Les lois établissant les droits
d'auteur, les brevets, la conception deprojets, lesmarquesdecommerce, les droits
de phytogénéticien et les droits en topographie de circuits intégrés, cependant, ne
suiventpas ce modèle. Elles créentplutôt despièges pour les avocats et avocates.
de common law etde droit civil. L'auteursoutientque la confusion actuelledevrait
être éliminéepar l'adoption d'une loifédérale unique applicable à tout le droit de
lapropriété intellectuelle, ens'inspirantdes récentes réformesdes loisprovinciales
sur la prescription .
Recently while trying to sort outthe law on limitation periods forcopyright
infringement, Ilooked upthe limitation provisions in otherCanadian intellectual
property statutes ,to see what light they threw on the subject. I emerged
befuddled . The other statutes did not help at all. In fact they were a complete
mess. The first part ofthis article sketches the difficulties in all of the statutes .
Thesecondpart examines one ingreater detail : that ofcopyright. Finally, I offer
some conclusions.
* DavidVaver, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario . I thank
my colleagues Harry Glasbeek, Reuben Hasson, and Garry Watson for their comments on
an earlier draft ; similarly, Malcolm E. McLeodofOgilvy Renault, Montreal, especially on
the law of Québec .
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I The intellectual property laws
There are now six federal statutes covering intellectual property . They deal
first with the basics : copyright, patents, industrial designs and trade-marks ; to
these wererecently added rights overintegrated circuit topographies ("ICTs" or
semiconductor chips) and new plant and seedvarieties . I The basic statutes trace
back to the time of confederation . Indeed, the industrial design legislation of
today is essentially an 1868 law, which stood virtually unchanged until major
amendments in 1988 and particularly in 1993 . The other basic fields -
copyright, patents and trade-marks - have also been substantially amended,
especially in 1993. These amendments included two affecting limitation
periods for patents and designs .
The subject of limitations can involve pressing issues of social policy .
People who have suppressedchildhood memories ofabuse or who find they are
now ill through prolonged exposure to harmful substances can testify to the
additional injury unfair limitation periods can cause them when trying to bring
wrongdoers to justice . Intellectual property cases lack this emotional impact.
True, the occasional aggrieved author, designer or inventor does claim for a
perceived injury to pocket or pride, but most litigants are businesses suing to
enjoin competitors from trespassing on their limited monopoly and to be
compensated for past incursions . Yet limitations have their importance here
too : ask any plaintiff, defendant, lawyer or lawyer's insurer who has run afoul
of them .
The law of limitations has, despite its significance, attracted few grand
ideas, as the plethora of law reform reports over the last few decades reveals .
The basic issue is whether the time-bar is good social policy for a particular case
or run of cases . Five obvious points may still be made about how such bars
should be framed, whether for intellectual property or other claims:
" some cut-off period is a good idea: nobody should sue for a harm that happened
a century ago ;
" litigants and their lawyers should know quickly and easily whatthat period is -
a fundamental principle of all legislation ;
the period should be the same for similar types of cases, unless there is a good
reason otherwise : arbitrary differences are just accidents waiting to happen ;
" where one legislature is responsible for enacting all the legislation, the drafting
of the provisions should be the same, unless there is a good reason why not:
different wording raises doubts (and so arguments) about whether the variation
is stylistic or substantive;
" the French and English versions of the law should say the same thing and the
drafting should be consistent as between statutes : francophones oranglophones
' The statutes, with theirR.S.C . 1985 reference, are in order ofenactment: Industrial
Design Act of 1868 (1-9) ; Copyright Act of 1921 (C-42) ; Patent Actof 1935 (P-4) ; Trade-
marksAct of 1953 (T-13) ; PlantBreeders' RightsAct of 1990 (P-14.6) ; Integrated Circuit
Topography Act of 1990 (1-14.6), in force since 1993 . The first four statutes have been
substantially amended since their original enactment.
z Intellectual Property Law ImprovementAct, S.C . 1993, c. 15 ; NorthAmerican Free
Trade Implementation Act, S .C . 1993, c . 44 .
1994]
Unfortunately, the limitations in the sixintellectual property statutes offend
one or more of these guidelines :
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should not constantly have to refer to the other language text to make sense of
their ownlanguage text.
the Trade-marks Act, PlantBreeders' Rights Act ("PBR Act") and (until a 1993
amendment is proclaimed into force) thePatentAct contain no limitation period
at all : but, perversely, this does notmean thereis no limitation period, as we shall
see;
limitation periods like that in the Copyright Act, which simply states that an
action is time-barred after a given period, do not mean what they say because
courts have grafted major exemptions on to them;
the periods vary for no clear reason: three years for copyright and industrial
designs, three years (subject to extension) for ICTs, sixyearsundertheproposed
amendmentfor patents, anything from threeyears in Quebec andsix years in the
common law provinces for trade-marks and PBRs ;
the drafting is commonto only two ofthe statutes : patents and industrial designs;
theEnglish and French versions of the statutes differ for no apparent reason, the
most egregious being patents and industrial designs where identical language in
the English versions is paired with radically different French versions .
These discrepancies are best seen if the provisions involved are tabulated:'
3 The Trade-marks Act and Integrated Circuit Topography Act are omitted because
they contain no express limitation statute.
' Between 1921 and 1988, the words "of copyright" appeared after "infringement" .
Theywere droppedin 1988 when the moral rights provisions oftheAct (the rightofauthors
to claim attribution and to prevent distortions oftheir work) were revamped: see now ss .
14.1, 14 .2, 28.1, and 28 .2 ofthe Copyright Act. Acourt had earlier suggested that moral
rightinfringements were "imprescriptible" because they fell outside the limitation period
for "copyright" in section 41 : see Vaver, "Authors' Moral Rights in Canada" (1983) 14
I.I .C . 329 at 349. Hence "infringement ofcopyright" became "infringement" toutcourt to
provide a uniform limitation for both moral rights and copyright.
5 Until 1988, the French version translated the English literally: "Une action pour
violation du droit d'auteur ne peut plus être intentée après l'expiration d'un délai de trois
ans à compter de cette violation." In ,1988 the French drafter tookthe opportunity of
Statute When in
force
English version French version
CopyrightAct (s . 41), 1988- An action in respect of Les actions pour
as amended in 1988 infringement' shall not violation se prescrivent
be commenced after the par trois ans à compter
expiration ofthree years de la violation.-'
immediately following
the infringement .
PatentAct (s . 55.01), not yet No remedy may be Tout recours visant un
as inserted in 1993 pro- awarded for an act of acte de contrefaçon se
claimed infringement committed prescrit à compter de
more than six years six ans de la
before the commence- commission de celui-ci.
ment of the action for
infringement .
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Statute
Industrial Design Act
(s . 18), as amended in
1993
Integrated Circuit
TopographyAct (s . 12),
first enacted 1990
When in
force
1994
1993
English version
No remedy maybe
awarded for an act of
infringement committed
more than three years
before the commence-
ment of the action for
infringement.
(1) Subject to subsection
(2), no royalties, damages,
profits or punitive
damages may be awarded
for any act ofinfringe-
ment committed more
than three years before
the commencement of the
action for infringement.
(2) The limitation period
described in subsection
(1) does not apply if
(a) the infringement is of
such a nature that, at the
time of its commission,
it would not have come
to the attention ofa
reasonably diligent owner
or licensee ofany right in
the registered topography ;
and
(b) the action for infringe-
ment is commenced with-
in three years after the
infringement came or
should have come to the
attention of the plaintiff.
French version
L'action en violation se
prescrit par trois ans à
compter de celle-ci .
(1) Sous réserve du
paragraphe (2), l'action
pour violation de la
protection visant
réparation de profits
perçus ou de dommages-
intérêts ou l'imposition
de dommages punitifs se
prescrit par trois ans à
compter de la violation.
(2) La prescription ne
joue toutefois pas si la
violation est d'une nature
telle qu'elle n'aurait pu
être décelée par un
propriétaire ou titulaire
de licence diligent et si
l'action est intentée dans
les trois années suivant le
moment où le demandeur
a décelé -ou aurait dû
déceler-la violation.
Despite these differences, the meanings of these provisions should be
essentially the same, wherever an infringement occurs andwhichevercourt-
federal or provincial -hears the case. However, with drafting variations as
wide as these, mistakes are inevitable . If one ignores minor but sometimes
critical drafting discrepancies 6 three broad types of problems are discernible.
completely rewriting section 41 . The change of"une action" to "les actions" presumably
indicates (subtly) thatmorethan onetypeofinfringement is now caught: i.e ., copyright and
moralrights . Compare thelaterdrafting ofthelimitation provision in theIndustrialDesign
Act which uses the singular: "L'action en violation. . ." . Unfortunately, as we shall see, the
Industrial Design Act provision is open to other objections .
s E.g ., in s. 12(2) of the Integrated Circuit Topography Act, the plaintiff has to be
"reasonably" diligent in finding out the wrong; in the French text, he has to be just
"diligent" . There seems no excuse for the non-equivalence.
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The missing statutes
Two statutes are missing from the table: the Trade-marksAct and thePBR
Act. This is because, as is still true of patents until the 1993 amendmentto the
Patent Act is proclaimed into force, no express limitation period appears in
either statute.
The Trade-marks Actcame into force in 1954, but it has been periodically
revised, particularly in 1993 by the same omnibusAct that introduced the new
limitation period for patents;' yet nothing was done in this respect for trade
marks. ThePBRAct is, on the other hand, very recent. It wasenacted in 1990,
thesameyear as theIntegrated Circuit TopographyAct("ICTAct") ; indeed, the
statutes were assented to within eight days of each other. Yet the PBRActhas
no limitation period, while theICTActhas. Whythe 18-year monopoly created
by the PBR Act should have no express limitation, but the 10-year monopoly
created by the ICTAct should have one of three years, is not readily apparent .
The absence of a limitation period inthe Trade-marks orPBRActs does not
mean -as an ingenuous reader might think-that they have no limitation
periods. Provincial andfederal courts' will,.'as they still do for patents, apply to
them the provincial limitation period for tort or (in Quebec) infringement of
moveable property rights (droits r6els mobiliers) . So an infringement in
Quebec is prescribed after three years; the same act in other common law
provinces will be time-barred after six years.9 Atime-bar ofsix years seems far
too long for a trade-mark infringement, which is usually detectable very
quickly; in any event, why trade-marks and PBRs should have different
limitation periods depending on where someone decides to infringe, seems
inexplicable. Federal jurisdiction over these rights is allocated or assumed
precisely because national uniformity is supposedly needed andinfringements
often occur interprovincially . In this respect, the rights resemble the other
intellectual property rights, whichdo have a limitation built into their statutes .
Limitation vs. prescription
The time-bars set out in the table are plainly intended to be common law
limitations, not civil law prescriptions. The statutes are common law in
structure and wording. Although copyright, patent and industrial design laws
have become more Canadianized over the years, they still bear the imprints of
Intellectual Property Law Improvement Act, supra footnote 2, s. 48, introducing
Patent Act, s. 55 .01 .
$ Federal CourtAct, R.S.C . 1985, c. F-7, s. 39(1). SeegenerallyR. H. Barrigar, "Time
Limitations on Dominion Statutory Causes of Action" (1964) 40 C.P.R. 82.
9 Art. 2295 C.C.Q . (formerly 2 years under C. CL. C., art. 2261(2)) ; Limitation Act,
R.S.O . 1990, s. 45(l)(g); Leesona Corp. v. Consolidated Textile Mills Ltd, [1978] 2S.C.R.
2 at 6-7 (Quebec) ; Reeves Bros. Inc. v. Toronto Quilting &Embroidery Ltd (1978), 43
C.P.R . (2d) 145 at 166-67 (Fed . T.D .) (Ontario and Quebec); Johnson Controls Inc. v.
VartaBatteries Ltd(1984), 80C.P.R . (2d)1(Fed.C.A.) (Ontario and semble NovaScotia) ;
Imperial OilLtdv. Lubrizol Corp. (1992), 98 D.L.R . (4th) 1 at 28-29 (Fed . C.A .) (Alberta)
- all patent infringement cases.
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U.K . law (copyright and industrial design), U.S . law (ICTs) or a mixtureofboth
(patents), and the appropriate foreign precedents are regularly used in their
interpretation . The copyrightlimitation is virtually a direct copy'° ofsection 10
of the old U.K. Copyright Act of 1911, itself patterned on the wording of the
English Limitation Act of 1623." The other limitations have also been
elaborated - quite fully for ICTs - using common law formulations.
The French texts present difficulties . They use prescription and its
derivatives as counterparts to the limitation concepts of the English text . Now
this is harmless if everyone understands prescription to mean "limitation" or,
perhaps more neutrally, "time-bar" . This is how prescription is used, for
example, throughout the Loi sur la prescription des actions, the French text of
Ontario's Limitations Act." The danger with the federal limitations is that
lawyers or judges reading the French text alone, especially if they are civilian-
trained, may assume the civil law concept ofprescription is intended . They will
not be disabused by looking across at the English version. A large body of
common law and equity jurisprudence on limitations applicable to the bars may
inadvertently be overlooked."
Limitations andprescriptions share some features but their differences can
be critical . A limitation is a common law time-bar. It bars only the remedy, not
the right . Itis not an overriding rule ofpublic policy or ordrepublic, butinstead
a defence that must be properly raised before a court gives it effect." A judge
may allow a defective pleadingto be amended to raise thepointlate, even during
an appeal . But the later the motion to amend, the lower the chances ofsuccess,
and the greater the chance the defendant will end up paying the plaintiff's costs
to date as the price of inadvertence." Peremptory words in a statute like "an
action. . . shall not be commenced" after a stated period have thus been glossed
'° See footnote 5 . Between 1921 and 1970, its marginal note nonetheless read
misleadingly : "Prescription of Action" . This changed in the R.S.C. 1985 version to
"Limitation Period ." As from 1988 (S.C.1988, c . 15, s. 9), the note reads neutrally "Time
limit for actions ." The French has remained consistently "Prescription" . The marginal
note here does not aid interpretation.
" 21 Jac. l, c . 16, s . 3 .
'z R.S.O . 1990, c . L.15 .
`a As occursin H . G. Richard &L. Carri6re(eds .), Canadian CopyrightActAnnotated,
vol . 2 (Scarborough : Carswell, 1993) at 41-43 to 41-49, which creates a confusing pot-
pourri of limitation and prescription jurisprudence . Meanwhile its review of case law
overlooks critical Supreme Court ofCanadajurisprudence on reasonable discoverability
startingwithKamloops (City) v.Nielsen, [1984] 2 S .C.R . 2 andCentral Trust Co. v.Rafisse,
[1986] 2 S.C.R . 147 .
'4 Copyright: Nicol v . Barranger, [1917-23] Mac . Cr.C.C . 219 at 228-29, rev'd on
other grounds, ibid., 230 (1921, C.A .) . Patents : Emms v. R., [1977] 1 F.C . 101 at 110-11,
rev'don other grounds, [1978] 2 F.C . 174 (C.A .) ; ConsolboardInc. v. MacmillanBloedel
(Sask.) Ltd (1978), 39 C.P.R. (2d) 191 at 222-23 (Fed . T.D .) ("ConsolboardI"), refusing
leave to amendpleadings to raise the defence, not varied on appeal, (1979) 41 C.P.R . (2d)
94 (Fed. C.A.), (1981) 56 C.P.R. (2d) 145 at 151(S.C.C .) ; ConsolboardInc. v. Macmillan
Bloedel (Sash) Ltd (1982), 63 C.P.R. (2d) 1 at 25-29 (Fed. T.D .) ("Consolboard 2").
's Indeed, in one patent case, defendant's counsel raised the defence in reply during
closing arguments at the end of a twenty-day trial. The judge refused leave to plead the
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to mean almost exactly the opposite of what they say. A claimant can
commence an action against an infringer any time she likes ; indeed, she cango
to trial, obtain ajudgment and execute on it, although the action is wholly or
partly time-barred. Thebaris more aprocedural than substantive rule . 16 Since
the early seventeenth century, a whole legal edifice has gradually been erected
on these premises : a defendant cannot have atime-barred claim struck before
filing adefence, since the court does not assume the defendant will formally or
properly plead the limitation ; the defendant's fraud, waiver, estoppel,
acquiescence, unconscionable conduct or binding agreement may trump the
defence; in conflicts of law, the court will apply the forum's limitation period
to a wrong committed elsewhere, though time-barred there; andso on .
Prescription,the formoftime-barapplied mainly" in Qu6bec, extinguishes
the right, andso with itthe remedy . Without anenforceable right, a court need
not wait for the defendant to plead or argue prescription and may of its own
accord strike the plaintiff's claim." Atleast, this was so until changes brought
in by Qu6bec's new Civil Code more fully recognized the adversarialnature of
civil litigation in the province . Acourt cannowact ofits ownmotiononlywhere
a statute expressly declares a remedy to be barred : this type ofbar is thought to
be a rule of ordre public. In other cases, the defendant must now plead
prescription : " the bar here -as at common law-is thought to engage only
the private interests of the parties.
The problems arising from the divergent French drafting are seen if one
considers asimple example. Suppose a claimant sues in Qu6bec for patent and
industrial design infringements that took place outside the six year limit for
patents" andthree year limit for designs. Thejudge looking at the time-bar in
the twoActs will find forpatents that "toutrecours . . se prescritàcompter de six
ans de la commission de [la contrefaçon]". Since the remedy seemsexpressly
barred, the courtmay apply Qu6bec law and strike the patent claimofits own
motion before the defendant pleads?' On looking at the Industrial Design Act,
defence since theplaintiffhadbeendeprived ofthe opportunitytoproducefacts that might
have avoided the plea : Consolboard No. 1, ibid.
11 Consolboard2, supra footnote 14 at 25-29. Theprocedural/substantive dichotomy
is not always insisted on: e.g., a time-bar may become a defendant's vested right, which
later legislation can take away only by clear language: R. v . Ford(1993), 106D.L.R . (4th)
325 at 335-37 (Ont . C.A .) .
"Prescription is alsoknown in commonlawjurisdictions. TheEnglishLimitationAct
of 1833 (3 &4Wm. IV, c. 27, s. 34) declared a claimant's "rightand title . . . extinguished"
incertain cases. Thishas alsobeenthegeneral ruleforlimitationsinBritishColumbia since
1975 : Limitation Act, R.S.B.C.1979, c. 236, s. 9; Heathv. Darcus (1990), 48 B.C.L.R . (2d)
259 at 262-63 (S.C.) .
'$ Leesona, supra footnote 9, referring to former C.C.LC. arts . 1138, 2261, 2267 and
2188 ; Consolboard 2, supra footnote 14 at 27 .
'9 Arts . 2878, 2881 C.C.Q. Prescription still operatesto extinguish therightorremedy:
Arts . 1671, 2875 .
z° The example assumes the 1993 limitation enacted for patents is in force.
2 ' "The court may not, of its own motion, supply theplea ofprescription . However,
it shall, ofits own motion, declare the remedyforfeited where so provided by law . Such
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the judge will find only that "faction en violation se prescrit par trois ans à
compter de celle-ci." Finding no express forfeiture ofthe remedy (la déchéance
du recours), the court, again applying Qu6bec law, may not strike the design
claim and will wait for the defendant to plead the time-bar . 22 This is the result
even though the English text of the two statutes is (except for the length of the
time-bar) identical!
A plaintiff facing these prospects may well prefer to proceed in the federal
court where the actions have a fighting chance ofsuccess . There, the court will
likely require the time-bar to be specially and fully pleaded for both claims,
following federal court rules and jurisprudence on limitations .23 If versed in
common law, the judge would almost certainly read the English "no remedy
may be awarded for an act of infringement committed more than six years" as
enacting a common law limitation . The court would therefore notentertain any
motion to strike before the time-bar is pleaded, and then only if the plaintiff
raisednoarguable groundin itsreplyfor avoiding the defence . Thejudge would
`rightly' consider any provincial legislation irrelevant .
Nothing can be said in favour of such discrepant results, which could not
possibly have been intended by the drafters of the statutory provisions .
Further drafting anomalies
Sometimeafter 1988, a decision musthavebeen takento draftthelimitation
provisions in intellectual property statutes more precisely, at least in their
English version . The ICTActhas the most elaborate provision. Itbars the award
of a remedy after three years ("no royalties, damages, profits or punitive
damagesmaybe awarded. . ."), subject to a "reasonable discoverability rule" : the
period runs from when a reasonably diligent claimant would have discovered
the infringement . The 1993 limitation forpatents and industrial designs enacts
only the first of these rules, and then in shorter form : "no remedy may be
awarded. . ." . Although the copyrightlaw was substantially amendedin 1993, its
limitation formula remained the same as in 1921 .
Paradoxically, this very variety ofdrafting compels the conclusion that the
time-bars mean the same, certainly for copyright, patents and designs . The
formula used in the French versions of the Industrial Design Actand Copyright
Act limitations is the same ; the English versions of the Patent Act and the
IndustrialDesign Actlimitations are the same ; theinterpretation to be placed on
all of them should therefore be the same. This means the time-bar must be a
commonlaw limitation, since the copyright time-barunquestionably is ; what is
true of it must be true of the others .
forfeiture is never presumed; it is effectedonlywhereit is expressly stated in the text" : Art .
2878 C.C.Q. (emphasis added.)
zz See previous footnote .
zs Federal CourtRule409, SOR/71-68 ; ConsolboardNo.1, supra footnote 14 at222-
23 ; Sandvik, A.B. v. Windsor Machine Co. (1986), 8 C.P.R. (3d) 433 at 443 (Fed . T.D .) .
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This also holds for the ICTAct. Its limitation formula is the same as that
forpatents and designs. TheICTreasonablediscoverabilityprovisionobviously
ousts the parallel common law rule developed in Canada since Kamloops
(City)v. Nielson;24 this express enactment should not affect the common law
rule's application to the other statutes or to provincial limitation periods
(without an equivalent statutory discoverability rule) applicable to trade-marks
andPBRs. The Supreme Court in 1940 specifically held the equitable doctrine
offraudulent concealment applied to copyright: so where an infringement was
covert, time started running only from when theplaintiff discovered or oughtto
have discovered the wrong?s Fraudulent concealment may still be pleaded
under the ICTAct since doctrines founded on fraud are not usually ousted by
implication.
It is unfortunate that a process of interpretation like this has to be adopted
for modern statutes coming from the same drafting source. Before suggesting
corrective measures, I propose to examine the copyright limitation more fully.
An action in respect of infringement
shall not be commenced after the
expiration of three years immediately
following the infringement.
II Copyright
It is convenient to set out again the limitation provision foundin section41
of the Copyright Act:
Les actions pour violation se
prescrivent par trois ans à compter
de la violation .
Since the provision was taken from section 10 of theU.K. CopyrightAct
1911, the drafting unsurprisingly follows the time-worn formulaofsection 3 of
the English limitation statute of 1623 :
All actions upon the case [i.e ., torts] shall be commenced and sued within six years
next after the cause of such actions or suit, and not after26
Thus, time in respect of an infringement that occurred on September 10,
1994 expires on midnight of September 10, 1997 . 27 If any infringements go
back six years before suit, the claimant will get compensation only for what the
infringer did in the last three years. He escapes for the earlier three years.21 The
za Supra footnote 13 .
zs Massie & Renwick Ltd v. Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd, [19401 S.C.R . 218 at
244. See section 41 in action, below commencing at 461 .
zs Supra footnote 11 . Unnecessary words are omitted .
z' Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 27(4). Apparently not even war stops the
clock ticking- unless Parliament changes or suspends the period, as happened during
World dear 11 . See Prideaux v. Webber (1657), 1 Lev. 31, 83 E.R . 282, where time kept
runningeven though thecourtshad shutdownduring the civil war. The rule mayberelaxed
for fraudulent concealment : see footnote 61, infra .
z8 Nicol v. Barranger, supra footnote 14 ; Leesona, supra footnote 9 (patents) . A
contrary rule is applied by some U.S . courts : for a continuing series of wrongs, time starts
running when the last act is done, so a plaintiff who sues within three years ofthe last act
460
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claimant is no better offasking for an account ofprofits instead of damages: the
limitation period covers both equitable and common law remedies .2s Delays
within the limitation period may, of course, affect the discretionary grant of
equitable relief, such as injunctions and accounts of profits. Equally, time-
barred infringements maybe used to support a claim for a quia timet injunction
against a continuing infringemennt3°
Why a three year time-bar?
Thereasons for having a limitation period for copyright are much the same
as for other wrongs ." Good legal claims do not improve over time . Memories
fadeas years pass, documents fade from sight andwitnesses pass on . Aclaimant
whothinksherrights havebeeninfringed shouldget her claimresolved quickly.
An infringershould, in time,be confidenthe can geton withhis life andbusiness
without being bothered by old claims of wrongdoing . The idea that claims
should in time be consigned to a legal scrapheap dates back, for disputes
involving land into ancient times, and for litigation involving other rights, at
least to 1623 in England, in which year the first patent lawwaspassed nearly a
century before the first copyright law.
Limitations are not always benign . One can sympathize with an alleged
infringer who says that he did no wrong and that, had the claimant complained
earlier, he couldhave broughtforwardwitnesses andpaper,bothnow regrettably
lost, to prove it . But ifthe infringer's roguery is clear, why should he get away
justbecause time has passed and aclaimanthas unaccountably hesitatedto sue?
A reluctance to let undeserving rogues off the hook where the wrong is plain
enoughcontinues toshape the attitude ofcommon lawjudgestowards limitation
periods . The result is, as a British judge confessed in 1970, that syntax and
semantics have little to do with interpreting limitation provisions."
Why three years for copyright and moral rights infringements? The
CopyrightAct in 1868 had a two-year limitation," a provision that lasted until
1924. During this time British authors, relying on a British statute of 1842 to
can claimfor the whole series extending back beyond that period : e.g., Taylor v . Meirick
712 F.2d 1112 (7th Circ . 1983) at 1118-19 . This is, however, controversial : see M. & D.
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (Bender, 1993), § 12-05.
29 Black v . ImperialBook Co. (1904), 5 O.L.R . 184 at 196, affd(1904), 8 O.L.R . 9
(C.A .), affd(1905), 35 S.C.R . 488;J.M. Voith Gmbh v . BeloitCorp. (1993), 47 C.P.R. (3d)
448 (Fed . T.D ., patents) . Theprincipledatesbackto the 18th century: Smithv . Clay (1767),
3 Bro. C.C. 639 at 640; 29 E.R . 743 at 744.
30 WarnerBros . -SevenArts Inc. v . CESM-TVLtd (1969), 58 C.P.R . 97 at 111(Ex .Ct) ;
Nicol v . Barranger, supra footnote 14 at 229.
3' Generally see G. Mew, The Law ofLimitations (Toronto: Butterworths,1991) at 7-
8 .
32Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd v . Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd, [19711 A.C . 850
at 880-81 (H.L .), by Lord Diplock.
33 CopyrightAct of1868, S.C. 31 Vic. c. 54, s.18, repeated through to CopyrightAct,
R.S.C . 1906, c. 70, s . 44.
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enforce their copyrights in literary and musical works in Canada, faced a one-
year limitation period.34 Nothing in the Canadian parliamentary debates
preceding the enactmentofthe CopyrightAct in 1921 sheds lighton the change.
The debates in England on section 10 of the 1911 U.K. Act are, however,
more revealing . The three-year limitation in the bill was attacked as too long
during thirdreading in theCommons and some membersfavoured retaining one
yearor extendingit tonomorethan two. TheSolicitor-General, Sir JohnSimon,
disagreed. He claimed the three-year period was reasonable given the
international dimensions ofcopyright . His main concern was that it might take
some time -more than a year -for an English author to find out about an
infringement in the British empire or elsewhere overseas ." The concern is at
first puzzling, because theU.K. limitation period wouldbe irrelevant inforeign
jurisdictions, whose courts would apply their own state's limitation period .
Simon must have had in mind that the British dominions would likely adopt
whatever limitation period the U.K. laid down; this should therefore be long
enough not to harm British interests abroad .
Simon prevailed and his prediction proved right. The dominions -
Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa, and finally
Canada-all adopted the three-year period in the copyright laws they enacted
duringthe decade following 1911 . The question maybe asked whether a period
dictated by colonialist considerations is still justifiable in Canada.
Section 41 in action
Provincial limitation or prescription statutes are irrelevant to actions
dealing with infringement of copyright or moral rights . The principles of
common law and equity applicable to limitations in general, as outlined in Part
I above, apply equally to copyright's section 41 . 36 Thetime-bar can therefore
be extended for an ever-increasing range of reasons.37
All this follows fromtwo decisions ofthe Supreme Courtin 1937 and 1940
whose full import has generally been overlooked. They involved litigation
brought by the Canadian Eire Underwriters' Association against non-member
insurers for the prolonged copying, without permission and for their own
business purposes, ofunpublished material the association had developedto set
insurance rates. The association claimed an injunction and damages not only
for infringement ofcopyright but also forconversion ofthe plaintiff's property,
34 Literary CopyrightAct 1842 (U.K.), 5 & 6 Vic. c . 45, s. 26.
ss Hansard, 17 August 1911 (Commons) at 2146 (Sir John Simon) ; similarly Sir
William Anson at 2146.
36 See text in paragraph following footnote 13 . Moreover, "[tjhe several Statutes of
Limitation[,j being all in pari materia, ought to receive a uniform construction,
notwithstanding any slight variations ofphrase, the object and intention being the same":
Murray v . East India Co . (1821), 5 B. &Ald. 204 at 215 .
s' See Limitation vs . prescription, above at456, third paragraph.
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an action under section 38 of the Copyright Act." The defendant pleaded the
section 41 time-bar to both actions ; alternatively, for the conversion action, it
pleaded that conversions in Ontario had a 6 year limitation under Ontario law,
and conversions in Qu6bec were prescribed after either two or three years .39
The association agreed the three-year limitation applied to copyright
infringement, but tried to extend it in two differing ways . First, taking up the
defendant's alternative pleading, it arguedthat provincial limitations applied to
conversion since this was not "an action inrespect ofinfringement ofcopyright"
within section 41 . This meant that, in Ontario, the equitable doctrine of
fraudulent concealment made the limitation run only from when the plaintiff
discovered or could reasonably have discovered ahidden wrong; in Qu6bec, the
prescription period was arguably 30 years, since the shorter terms were
available only to good faith defendants .4° Second and alternatively, if section
41 did apply, fraudulent concealment applied to federal limitations too and so
avoided the three year bar .
The pointabout provincial law was dealt withbefore trial . Maclean J . in the
Exchequer Courtruled section 41 did indeed apply to conversion actions ." The
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. In deliveringjudgment, Hudson J . said
he thought it "improbable" that Parliament intended different limitations for
conversion and infringement actions, especially since both actions could be
heard by either the Exchequer Court or provincial courts .42 The action went to
trial and the plaintiff succeeded in both infringement and conversion. The
defendant had obtained the material surreptitiously from the plaintiff's agents,
removed markings identifying the plaintiffand the agents, and keptthe copying
and use of the material hidden. Maclean J . called this fraudulent concealment
and allowed damages beyondthe three yearperiod to be recovered." Again the
38 Section38 reads : "All infringing copies of any work in which copyright subsists, or
of any substantial partthereof, and allplates used or intended to beused forthe production
of the infringing copies shall be deemed to be the property of the owner of the copyright,
who accordingly may take proceedings for the recovery ofthe possession thereof and in
respect ofthe conversion thereof."
3s CCLC, art . 2261(2), two years for "damages resulting from offences or quasi-
offences [délits ou quasi-délits], whereverother provisions do not apply" ; art. 2268, three
years for "corporeal moveables ."
40 C.CL. C, art. 2242 . In the second appeal decided in 1940, the plaintiff cited Drolet
v. Bouchard (1921), 27R.L.N.S . 359 at 361 (Que .,C . deRev.) andtext-writers likeLaurent
and Planiol for the malafides exception : Massie &Renwick Ltd v. Underwriters' Survey
Bureau Ltd, supra footnote 25, respondent's factum at 71-72 .
4' Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd v. Massie &Renwick Ltd, [19371 Ex . C.R. 15 at
22-23 .
42 Massie &RenwickLtdv. Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd, [1937] S.C.R . 265 at
270. The same result was later reached in England : Caxton Publishing Co. Ltd v.
Sutherland Publishing Co. Ltd, [1939] A.C . 178 (H.L.) .
43 Underwriters'Survey Bureau Ltdv. Massie &RenwickLtd, [1938] Ex . C.R. 103 at
126-28 . In theU.S ., marking an infringing workwith acopyright notice in the defendant's
own name morerecently qualified as fraudulent concealment : an act "calculated to throw
purchasers, and [the plaintiff] himself, offthe scent" : Taylor v. Meirick, supra footnote 28
at 1118 .
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Supreme Courtaffirmed44 The defendant specifically argued thatcommonlaw
and equitable principles on general limitations were irrelevant to section 41 :
[T]he defence [of fraudulent concealment as applied in Bulli Coal Mining Co. v.
Osborne [1899] A.C . 351 (P.C ., Aust.) and other cases] was based upon a general
statute of limitations and what was decided was that in view of the nature of the
Defendant's conduct, such a general statute should not in the circumstances be
regarded as barring the plaintiff's rightof action. The Defendant's contention that
these decisions have no application rests uponthreegrounds, namely: (1) that here the
right of action is given and the time limitation imposed by the same statute : . . . .
The right to sue for infringement of copyright is one which depends wholly on the
provisions of The Copyright Act, section [63] ofwhichprovides that "no one shall be
entitled to copyright or any similar right . . . otherwise than under and in accordance
withtheprovisions ofthis Act." The remedies for infringement ofcopyrightgivenby
this statute are so given subject to the condition that,any action to obtain them must
be commenced within a limited time . The Plaintiffs are not, in the Defendant's
submission, entitled . .. toassertthatthe words usedin [section 41] are notbindingupon
them, but must be read subject to a qualification which Parliament has not seen fit to
enact4s
The argument was summarily rejected by Duff C.J . for the Court :
There remains the question of the Statute of Limitations [sic] . The point which has
concerned me most as to this feature ofthe appeal is whether, in view ofthe factthat
the rights the respondents seek to enforce are the creature of the statute, you can go
beyond the statute for the purpose of ascertaining the statutory limitation.
Ihavecometo the conclusion, however, thatthe principle appliedinBulliCoalMining
Co . v . Osborne [1899] A.C . 351 cannot be limitedto underground trespasses, that it
covers this case andthatthere was ample evidence in support oftheconclusion ofthe
learned trialjudge that there had been fraudulent concealmentwithin the meaning of
the rule; with the consequence that the limitation period began to run only on the
discovery ofthe fraud, or atthe time when, with reasonable diligence, it would have
been discovered .46
Fraudulent concealmenthas come torequire neitherfraud norconcealment.
Any deliberate conduct that is viewed as unconscionable between the parties is
considered fraudulent ; the wrong, if unknown to the plaintiff, is considered
concealed, even if the defendant did not actively hide it47 So a claimant who
discovers in 1994 thather rights were infringed in 1988 has until 1997 to sue for
the 1988 infringement if she proves fraudulent concealment."
44 The plaintiff once again tried to argue, as an alternative, thatprovincial law applied
totheconversion claims : see the respondent's factum at67-70. TheSupreme Court didnot
even bother referring to this attempt to reargue apoint the plaintiff had lostbefore it three
years earlier.
45 Massie & Renwick Ltd v . Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd, supra footnote 25,
appellant's factum at 34, § 83 .
46 Massie, supra footnote 25 at244, referred towith approval inM.(K.) v .M.(H.) (1992),
96 D.L.R . (4th) 289 at 318 (S.C.C .). The suggestion in Richard & Carrière, supra footnote
13 at 41-48, that the time-bar extinguishes the cause of action and that common law
jurisprudence is somehowirrelevantto theinterpretation ofsection 41 is thereforemisguided.
4' Guerin v. R. (1984), 13 D.L.R . (4th) 321 at 345 (S.C.C .) ; M.(K.) v . M.(H.), ibid. at
320-21 .
48 Massie & Renwick Ltd v . Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd, supra footnote 25 ;
Warner Bros.-Seven Arts Inc. v . CESM-TVLtd, supra footnote 30 at 247 .
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Morerecently, theSupreme Court ofCanadahasfollowedU.S . developments
to delete the requirement that a defendant has acted unconscionably . Time now
may run from when the claimant should, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered the material facts on which the wrong was based, not when the
wrong was done or completed4 9 Indeed, time may even be postponed until
when aplaintiff, knowing the material facts, could reasonably have discovered
their wrongfulness." The focus is (unlike fraudulent concealment) less on the
blameworthiness ofthe defendant's conduct than on whether it was reasonable
forthe claimantto take as long as she did to discoverthe wrong. Like fraudulent
concealment, "reasonable diligence" carries no time limit, so claimants can sue
for wrongs done decades ago .
The reasonable discoverability rule should apply to intellectual property,
including copyright . Limitation provisions are generally construed alike;" the
ICT Act expressly recognizes the appropriateness of the rule for intellectual
property; U.S . courts on a similar copyright limitationprovision apply reasonable
discoverability;" and a major reason for adopting the rule in Canada- not to
leta defendant offthe hookjust because the harm he causes the plaintiff is latent
and may take years to detect - may also apply to copyright and other
intellectual property infringements." Some may object this makes section 41
mean something other than what it says, 54 but the protest comes too late : the
Supreme Courtbrushed it asidein 1940when engraftingafraudulentconcealment
exception on to section 41, and has continued in this spirit in extending
reasonable discoverability to other limitation provisions since 1984.
This does not mean the development as regards copyright is free from
criticism . It would certainly have surprised the Parliament that passed the 1911
U.K . copyright bill . Duringthird reading in the Commons, a member suggested
" Central Trust Co. v. Rafitse, supra footnote 13 at 224 .
50 M(K) v. M.(H.), supra footnote 46 at 312, a childhood incest case . This gloss
should rarely be needed in copyright cases.
s' See footnote 36.
$2 Taylor v. Meirick, supra footnote 28 at 1117-18, applying reasonable discoverability
and fraudulent concealment to copyright claims . TheU.S . provision reads : "No civil action
shall be maintained . . . unless it is commenced within three years after the cause of action
arose" : Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C . § 507(b). A similar cryptically drafted 3-year
period applies to ICT infringements in the U.S . (ibid., § 911(d)) ; the copyright approach will
undoubtedly apply to it too. Taylor v. Meirick extends time in yet another way. Infringers
are placed undera continuing duty to take reasonable steps to prevent further infringements ;
breach ofthis duty is called a further infringement: ibid. at 1117 . This is inappropriate in
Canada, where courts cannot just insert another right in the Copyright Act for the benefit
of copyright owners : Compo Co. v. Blue CrestMusic Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 327-33 ;
CBSSongs Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc, [1988] 1 A.C . 1013 (H.L.).
Ss In his leading U.S . text, P. Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law & Practice
(Boston : Little, Brown & Co., 1989), § 9 .1 .2, approves ofreasonable discoverability for
copyrightlimitations because infringements are "often dispersed and evanescent and will
rarely be as evident as a personal injury or even a trespass to real property ."
54 As occurred in Constructions nouvelle dimension Inc. v.Alarie, [1992] J.E . 92-938
(Que . C.S .), set out in Richard & Carrière, supra footnote 13 at 14-18, refusing to apply
reasonable discoverability to section 41 .
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time run from when the plaintifffirst became aware of the infringement, but Sir
John Simon, the Solicitor-General, responded for the government :
[T]hat is really an undesirable complication. It raises an extra issue-sometimes a
very difficultone todetermine . It really is, as arule,better tolaydown asuitable length
of time ."
This reflected the strict British view that time ran from when all material
facts for a cause of action were present, whether or not the plaintiff knew of
them, and thatfraudulent concealment did not apply to common law orstatutory
wrongs." This view was also current in Canada when its copyright limitation
period was enacted in 1921 . As the twentieth century progressed, of course,
British and Canadian attitudes towards limitations have relaxedconsiderably.57
Still, it is a fair objection that a change the U.K. and presumably the Canadian
parliament chose not to make has effectively been enacted in Canada by the
judges . Legislative initiatives in copyright usually are the subject of lengthy
debate andconsideration. Nothinglike this has occurredforthe time limitation.
III Conclusion
As noted, the features of limitation described for copyright should apply
equally to patents, industrial designs, and (subject to the built-in statutory
reasonable discoverability principle) ICT rights as well . Thepointremains that
these provisions are unsatisfactory for the reasons set out in Part I above.
Legislation should mean what it says . By not doing that, the limitation
provisions are traps for litigants, lawyers and judges .
Aminimal first corrective stepwouldbeto standardizethe language in both
the French and English versions of the federal statutes, make clear that the
provisions are limitations not prescriptions, and introduce like provisions into
the Trade-markand PPRActs. Asecond step wouldbe torationalizetheperiods
involved . The lesson from copyright is obvious. The reasons theU.K . had for
adopting a three-yearlimitation in 1911 are of little relevance today in Canada,
giventhe speed ofmodern communications . Even with slower communications
in 1911, it is interestingthatBritishlegislators viewedthree years as the absolute
upper limit, whether or not the claimant could with reasonable diligence have
discovered the wrong, and whether the wrong occurred locally or abroad ."
The final step is the most important. Limitations in intellectual property
Ss Hansard, supra footnote 35 .
5sE.g . P.H. Winfield, A Textbook of the Law ofTort (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1937) at 686-87 .
57Copyright intheU.K . was affectedbygeneralreforms inthelimitationlaws enacted
in 1939 and 1980. The Canadian provinces have either reformed or proposed to reform
their limitation laws, but the federal government has done little in the area.
SaWithout fanfare, the U.K. dropped the 3 year period from its CopyrightAct 1956;
it does not reappear in the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. The 6 year
limitation for tort, extendable for deliberate (i .e ., fraudulent) concealment, has therefore
appliedtocopyrightinfringement sincethe 1956Act : see nowLimitationAct1980 (U.K.),
ss .2, 33 . This need not, of course, be the right period for Canada.
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obviously need clarification. A "quick fix" solution is to givejudges the right
to extend time-bars as they think fit, as federal limitation provisions do for
salvage and collisions at sea ;59 but a formula that may work for marine insurers
is not necessarily apt to cater to the different interests surrounding intellectual
property. Is it not time that a federal limitation statute, based onthe more recent
provincialmodels, was passed to deal with the probem6° Perhapsprescription
(as in Quebec and British Columbia) might make more sense today for
intellectual propertythanlimitation. Whatshouldextend theperiod : adefendant's
acknowledgment orfraudulent concealment, a plaintiff's lack ofdue diligence?
Mayfraudulentconcealment suspend a clock thathas already started running ?61
Should the period start or stop running for plaintiffs or defendants under
disability, e.g., minors or those who are disabled physically or mentally?62
Should theperiod for conversion or detention ofinfringingmaterialrestart with
each fresh conversion or detention, or should the. clockrun from the first act? 63
Should therebe an ultimate period beyondwhichnoactioncanbebrought, fraud
or due diligence notwithstanding? The more modern provincial limitation
statutes and the Civil Code of Québec provide solutions to most of these
problems, so federal policymakers hardly need to reinvent the wheel.
We may applaud the willingness ofthe Supreme Court to expand old-style
limitation periods (without any cap) in areas like negligence or child abuse ;
these precedents nodoubtapplymeanwhiletointellectual propertyinfringements,
despite the dissimilarities of the wrongs involved . But many gaps remain that
cannot be satisfactorily filled through case-by-case adjudication . The question
ofwhatpolicy is best suitedto intellectual property can be answered only by the
federal government and, ultimately, Parliament .
11 E.g., Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1985, c . S-9, s . 471(2) (salvage), s . 572(3)
(damage to vessels) . No doubt, a list ofnon-exhaustive criteria could be added, as occurs
in the Limitation Act 1980 (U.K.), s . 33(3) for personal injury cases : the length of and
reasons for the delay, the continued reliability of evidence, the defendant's conduct, any
disability ofthe plaintiff, the plaintiff's diligence on learning he might have an action, and
any expert advice taken ; called a "curious hotchpotch" in Thompson v. Brown, [1981] 1
W.L.R. 744 at 751 (H.L .) .
60 Barrigarcalled for this 30 years ago: supra footnote 8 at 92 . Logically, there should
be a full-blown limitation statute for all proceedings under federal law . I have not
investigated this broaderpoint, although a limitation statute for intellectual property could
be used as a model for a more extensive federal statute .
6' British law atpresent saysno, butthe arguments ofjustice aremoreevenlybalanced :
cfSheldon v. R.H.M Outhwaite (UnderwritingAgencies)Ltd, [ 199411 W.L.R. 754 at 757
(Q.B.D .)with it's reversal by a majorityon appeal : [ 1994] 3 W.L.R.999esp . at 1008 (C.A.) .
61 Under section 7 ofthe Statute ofLimitations of 1623 (Eng .), time started running,
foractions on the case such as infringements underthe CopyrightAct 1911 (U.K.), against
aminor on reaching majority andagainst a person ofunsound mind on recovery . This may
notapply by implication to federal limitation statutes : Clark v. CanadianNationalRailway
Co. (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 679 at 686-87 (S .C.C.), holding minors (there atwo-year old
personal injury victim) bound by a two-year limitation in the Railway Act. But see
quotations accompanying footnotes 45 and 46 above.
63E.g., in BritishColumbia, the clockruns fromthefirst actofconversion: Limitation
Act, supra footnote 17, s . 10 . Otherwise it might run indefinitely each time possession or
property ofthe copies changes hands : Eddis v . Constable, [1969] 2 Ch . 345 at 358 (C.A.) .
